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Abstract—The biggest software development companies 
conduct daily more than hundreds deployments which influence 
currently operating IT (Information Technology) systems. This is 
possible due to the availability of automatic mechanisms which are 
providing their functional testing and later applications 
deployment. Unfortunately, nowadays, there are no tools or even a 
set of good practices related to the problem on how to include IT 
security issues into the whole production and deployment 
processes. This paper describes how to deal with this problem in 
the large mobile telecommunication operator environment.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
RESENTLY, more and more organizations are deciding to 
move their assets into the cloud environments. Current 
market conditions clearly justify this trend. It is more than 
enough to support this hypothesis just by analyzing the offers of 
cloud services by companies like Google and Amazon which 
provide solutions, such as Google Cloud Platform or Amazon 
Web Services [10]. There are also plenty of other platforms 
which are being offered by smaller companies working in 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) [10] models which are based, 
for example, on the Open Source OpenStack [9] platform. 
 This trend is caused by many factors, such as the price of such 
service or possibility to integrate most popular project 
methodology i.e. an agile development of IT system life cycle 
[4]. Currently, more and more teams are deciding to work in 
DevOps [1] methodology (clipped compound of the 
Development and Operations) which combines software 
development with information technology operations. The main 
goals of these two approaches are to shorten system 
development life cycle while delivering features, fixes and 
updates. Thanks to the mentioned cloud infrastructure 
architecture all together (methodology and tools) are being 
easily integrated with each another. 
In this paper we will introduce a novel approach to managing 
security of IT systems, which is based on the metric that allows 
to evaluate in real-time manner the security level 
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of an IT system (or particular change during patching process) 
and evaluates if it meets requirements which are described in 
Section V. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II briefly 
introduces the most relevant existing works related to the topic 
of this paper. Then in Section III DevOps and cloud computing 
concepts are described with the special focus on their security 
aspects. Next, in Section IV solutions that enable measuring 
security levels are characterized, while in Section V a novel 
metric to express this level is described. Finally, in Section VI a 
case study is presented to prove the usefulness of the proposed 
approach, and Section VII concludes our work. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
There are many works which are focused on investigating the 
level of security for the cloud infrastructure environment, e.g., 
[3], [8], [11], or [12]. Some of them are focused on creating a 
set of tests (benchmarks) for the infrastructure provider layer 
(OpenStack [10]), while other  introduce interesting 
implementations of SAST (Static Application Security Testing) 
and DAST (Dynamic Application Security Testing) security 
scanners [2], [14]. A system which aim is to detect violations of 
IT Security principles, described in [17] can be used as Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) in projects operating on a public cloud. 
The closest to the approach described in this paper is the 
solution presented in [19], which proposes to evaluate IT 
security of the cloud environment based on the defined metric 
which describes an acceptable level of security (which is 
calculated based on the number of discovered vulnerabilities). 
The complete process of security management for the 
mentioned work is illustrated in Fig. 1.  
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 The proposed system architecture is a good starting point 
from where IT Security evaluation of the cloud environment 
could be made. It covers multiple areas which should be taken 
into consideration during threat management process. It gathers 
information about the system components as well as 
requirements for the configuration and vulnerabilities. 
Unfortunately, in order to create fully automated process there 
also has to also available an information about the context which 
should describe application running inside particular system 
ecosystem. 
 Each of the above mentioned solution lacks application 
context and environment in which the application is deployed. 
In this work we would like to fill this gap by proposing a metric 
which will take both – the application-level context and the 
application run time environment into consideration. 
III. DEVOPS AND PUBLIC CLOUD SECURITY 
DevOps methodology was presented for the first time in 2009 
[1] but its real expansion can be observed during the last few 
years. This trend is related to the fast development of tools 
within the class Continuous Integration / Continuous 
Deployment (CI/CD) which are ideally designed to ensure a 
proper level of tasks automation, such as virtual machine 
deployment or running newly created source code onto proper 
machine. Discussing the details of the DevOps model is outside 
the scope of this paper, but in a nutshell its essence is related to 
treating the whole infrastructure as a code written in ansible or 
terraform [12]. Both tools are opensource software that 
automates software provisioning and configuration 
management. This approach allows to prepare the piece of a 
source code that is responsible for configuring the virtual 
machine, configuring firewall rules, pulling the source code 
from the repository and then start the web application server. 
Taking IT security into consideration, such an approach has 
many advantages like recurrence of operations (a user may 
forget to implement one of hundreds firewall rules, however 
once prepared program cannot), homogeneity of the 
environment and the speed of action. Considering above, there 
are also disadvantages to be acknowledged, such as – broad 
range of permissions given to a tool that is widely available. 
Critical vulnerability found in one element (CI/CD) which 
contains provider configuration may put the whole platform at 
risk as it can be compromised. In the whole process of software 
development, many other points are related with the identified 
threats such as identity management, verification of images used 
(which are installed on the servers), software testing or checking 
for available updates. In each of these areas, security 
management is necessary and can be performed in several ways. 
 Development methodologies are not the only “location” 
where IT security should be considered. The other is the 
infrastructure layer. The primary goal of the OpenStack (which 
now is leading technology for the cloud computing 
infrastructure) was to create global standards for the cloud 
environments. Continuous need for more computing power, 
increased disk storage and faster than before data access have 
led to the development of this platform. It must be also 
emphasized that OpenStack has significantly evolved from the 
first published version of this software in 2010 which had only 
two modules – Nova and Swift. The version of Queens 
published in February 28, 2018 has as many as 39 modules. It 
must be also noted that a lot of new factors have been considered 
from the security point of view. That could compromise both 
software infrastructure and stored information. 
Table I illustrates how the OpenStack platform has developed. 
More and more important features are being added by the 
platform itself (and can be automated), for example, managing 
Domain Name Server (DNS) or storing encryption keys. Each 
release of a new version contains new possible attack vectors, 
so securing such an environment should be a continuous 
process.  
Therefore, in this case, it is crucial to perform a risk analysis to 
identify areas that require special attention. It should be 
performed to adopt appropriate security mechanisms that would 
minimize the probability of launching a successful attack on a 
system. 
Note, that the security within public cloud environments (the 
whole or a part of so-called hybrid cloud [6]) can be described 
on several levels: 
– IaaS Layer – continuous verification of settings, including a 
list of administrator accounts and an analysis of the permissions,  
– Operating System Layer of running virtual machines – 
continuous verification of the current software updates, 
– Network Layer – continuous verification of the method of how 
the system is being exposed in various network segments, 
verification of launched services (if there are no running ports 
that are typically used in the well-known network attacks), 
verification of whether multiple machines do not have excessive 
connection permissions to each other, 
– Application Layer – continuous security tests of the web 
applications, mobile applications and APIs as well as source 
code analysis from the security perspective,  
– CI / CD Layer – verification of the running scripts. 
 
TABLE I 
SELECTED OPENSTACK MODULES 
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IV. METHODS FOR MEASURING SECURITY LEVEL 
A. IaaS Layer 
Every of currently available IaaS platform has an API that 
allows both reading and modifying data in order to obtain full 
information on how resources are used. It is necessary to be able 
to automatically retrieve information about currently running 
servers along with information about addresses of interfaces and 
the configuration of firewalls rules. Another important aspect is 
the list of users who have access to the IaaS layer and their 
permissions. The whole functionality consists of the necessary 
component which is called Service Discovery module that is 
responsible for gathering information about assets that build 
system. 
B. CI/CD Layer 
As CI/CD tools can be described as a software designed to 
support whole deployment process it is hard to define it as a 
separate layer, but for the purpose of this paper we will do so 
(full automation processes are going through CI which makes it 
great place to put security evaluation mechanisms). 
In a fully automated environment, all resources will be run by 
previously prepared scripts, e.g., using ansible or terraform. The 
mere appearance of a new virtual machine without information 
about running a script that creates such a machine may indicate 
a security breach (but it does not necessarily have to). If 
configured and used appropriately, the CI layer is an invaluable 
source of information that feeds the Service Discovery module. 
We are able, for instance, to obtain information on the 
parameters of the machine that is running or the branch of code 
which is currently compiled in order to be published on the 
server soon. And in addition to information obtained from the 
IaaS layer, it gives us full knowledge about what applications 
are running on what resources. 
C. The Operating System Layer 
In this case we are considering if components of the solution 
like operating systems are configured properly. Organizations 
like the Center for Internet Security (CIS [3]) are preparing a list 
of good practices which should be fulfilled in order to create as 
much secure as it is possible  component. CIS is sharing security 
benchmarks for OSes like: Centos, Redhat, or Ubuntu. In 
addition, test suites are available for solutions such as 
Kubernetes and Docker. Proper source codes are possible to be 
downloaded from the Github which implements CIS 
requirements and checks the system on which it runs against 
them (requirements). The outcome is in the form of 
“requirement – result”. The second important element to be 
examined is the presence of the automatic updates (at least when 
it comes to the updates that are marked as security fixes). 
D. Network Layer 
Assuming that we are in the possession of complete information 
on how an IT system has been built (from the Service Discovery 
element which gathered information about IaaS platform and 
obtained information from the CI/CD) it is possible to prepare a 
set of security tests by automated tools like Tenable Nessus or 
OpenSource solution like w3af [5]. The results of such a 
network test is complete information on how certain server is 
being used, i.e., information on currently opened ports and 
which services are listening on them. The last step to fully 
evaluate this layer is to compare the discovered opened ports 
with the intended configuration. It is possible by utilizing a 
configuration file which is used by the CI and is called the 
docker file. An exemplary docker file is presented in Fig. 3. 
In this case, the application is using only port TCP “8888”. If 
security test discovers opened TCP “80” port with an  active 
web application server listening on it, this could be an indicator 
that  the hardening process did not go well and it should be 
repeated. 
E. Application Layer 
If we are considering the security of applications, there are two 
sets of tests to be mentioned: automatic security tests (done by 
a specific tools) and manual penetration testing (done by a 
qualified expert). The latter is always more accurate (a human 
can try to examine context which machines typically do not 
understand) but in environments like the one we are mentioning 
in this paper (where changes are deployed frequently) it is 
almost impossible to implement. The main reason for this is the 
time which an expert needs to perform the penetration test. 
During the time required for performing a single test, a team of 
developers could prepare several changes. Thus, waiting for the 
test to be completed delays the release of application version 
which is ready to be put on production infrastructure(one of the 
key reasons why to switch to DevOps methodology is related to 
shorter releases time). 
 
 
 Automatic security tests can be done by several types of 
scanners: static application security testing (SAST – mostly 
source code analysis) which conducts a set of tests on the static 
source code. Unfortunately, results of the SAST scanning often 
contain multiple false positives, for example, identified 
vulnerability could be impossible to exploit in the context of 
running application. In contrast, the Dynamic Application 
 
Fig. 2. An exemplary configuration of the dockerfile 
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Security Testing (DAST) which conducts automatic penetration 
security testing, e.g., by crawling a website and use well-known 
web application vulnerabilities in order to evaluate its security 
are more accurate. But they also have some issues – from which 
the biggest one is the limited scope of testing scenarios which 
depends on type of tool used. There is also another class of 
automated testing tools – Interactive Application Security 
Testing (IAST) which combines static and dynamic testing. In 
this paper we do not consider IAST scanners which are available 
to use (both opensource and commercial ones) as they are 
strongly attached to the software development strategy. Most of 
the IAST scanners are being executed during functional unit 
testing (where it is known which part of the source code is 
responsible for the certain website functionality). However, it is 
crucial that the unit tests of application should be created 
properly for the IAST to function. The solution presented in this 
paper will be evaluated within the Telecommunication Provider 
environment where dozens of development teams work 
simultaneously and each one of them is using different testing 
strategy. 
 In the course of our future work, as a long-term goal, we 
would like to introduce an alternative to the IAST scanners 
which are available on the market today. Its main advantages 
are that it will be independent of the run time environment and 
it will be based on the findings from the DAST and SAST 
scanners. Using obtained results, the machine learning 
algorithms will group vulnerabilities in a way that each 
vulnerability found from the dynamic scan will be linked with a 
specific vulnerability found during the static analysis. In this 
way a developer will be able to get information which particular 
line of the source code is responsible for vulnerability in the web 
application, which in the end will expedite the fixing process. In 
order to achieve this purpose there two types of algorithms to be 
used. First one is to create relation between findings which came 
from different sources – therefore a clustering algorithm is 
necessary to be applied. Then in order to determine if the 
identified vulnerability is exploitable or it is just not an issue a 
classifying algorithm would be needed. In this moment of 
maturity of the project it is not yet decided if it will be basic 
implementation of k-means[13], LDA [8] or SVM[7] or 
modified version of those. 
V. THE PROPOSED GRADING METRIC 
From the layers described in Section IV, first two (IaaS and 
CI/CD layers) can be described as part of a system responsible 
for providing information about the environment and assets in 
an automatic manner. The rest of them are related to the 
anomaly detection. 
 The quality of the created classifier can be measured with the 
four  standard binary classification metrics: 
• 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =
𝑇𝑃+𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃+𝑇𝑁+𝐹𝑃+𝐹𝑁
 which is the ratio of 
correctly classified events to the whole set. 
• 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑃
 which describes classification 
ability not to detect false events. 
• 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁
 which describes classification ability 
to detect actual anomalies. 
• 𝐹1 =
2∗𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛∗𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛+𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
 which is a weighted average of  
the classifier precision and recall. 
where, TN – is true negative (vulnerability which is not possible 
to be exploited in a described context), TP – true positive 
(vulnerability which is possible to be exploited), FN – false 
negative (vulnerability which can be exploited but is inversely 
marked by a classifier), FP – false positive (vulnerability which 
cannot be exploited but is marked as exploitable). Properly 
created classificator to be considered useful should has both 
precision and recall at the highest possible level.. 
 While having one source of data and one classifier problem, 
we are limited just to calculating its precision and recall. When 
having multiple data sources (e.g. more vulnerability scanners) 
metrics are harder to be evaluated because each vulnerability 
found will have different significance (it depends on the data 
source, scanner and application context). It is easy to imagine 
that the Cross Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability will be treated 
as more important threat while occurring in the web application 
graphic user interface (GUI) and differently while occurring in 
web application used only by an application programming 
interface (API). A good starting point could be analyzing 
OWASP [13] top 10 vulnerabilities report in order to describe 
metrics for the most popular vulnerabilities in web applications 
(see Fig. 3). 
 
 
The proposed approach to calculate security level metric of the 
solutions deployed in the cloud environment is as follows: 
 
𝐿𝐶 ∗ ∑ (
𝑇𝑃∗𝑊
𝑇𝑃
)𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑠 ∗ 𝑃             (1) 
 
where, 
LC – Coverage level of the security events collection, 
TP – True positive count for the particular classifier, 
W – Weight of the detected vulnerability, 
P – Precision value for the evaluated classifier. 
We believe that a single metric which indicates the level of 
security based on the coverage level and depends on the 
 
 
Fig. 3. OWASP top 10 vulnerabilities for web applications [13] 
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classifier recall (classifier ability to detect existing security 
vulnerabilities) and each identified true positive value weight 
would be most effective in the scale of the Telecommunication 
Operator environments. 
It is hard to find information about how other researchers are 
calculating this metric and even harder to obtain detailed 
information on how it is obtained in the commercial solutions 
(e.g. ThreatFix) so in the future works it will be proven by 
comparison that the described metric is superior when compared 
to other solutions. 
VI. CASE STUDY 
In order to prove the usefulness of the introduced security 
metric, a manual analysis of the vulnerabilities for a single 
application has been performed. Experimental data has been 
obtained from the real-life security testing processes from one 
of the major mobile network operator in Poland. As a test object 
a web application built from Java microservices has been 
selected. A list of false positives, identified as vulnerabilities but 
marked by an expert as not major, and a list of true positives, 
treated as vulnerabilities and marked as exploitable, from the 
last 5 deployments in DevOps model of a given application have 
been prepared. Only two security issue sources were available 
for the presented IT system – source code security audit and CIS 
kubernetes and docker benchmark compliance. SAST analysis 
is being conducted by using MicroFocus Fortify software, and 
CIS benchmark compliance verified using set of scripts 
prepared by Github’s user - dev-sec (kubernets 2.11 and docker 
1.13 version). Single run described the particular deployment 
made on the production ecosystem. In this case study we have 
analyzed last 5 deployments, where run 1 is the farthest in time 
and run 5 is the latest one. Overall scheme of the study is 
presented in Fig 4. 
 
Fig. 4. Case study scheme 
 
 
 
TABLE II 
EVALUATION OF THE PRESENTED METRIC 
Application 1 
Run Scanner TP FP Weight Precision sum score 
1 Code 172 807 0.5 0.18 0.09 0.33 
Audit 84 89 0.5 0.49 0.24 
2 Code 177 912 0.5 0.16 0.08 0.32 
Audit 82 89 0.5 0.48 0.24 
3 Code 230 798 0.5 0.22 0.11 0.43 
Audit 115 68 0.5 0.63 0.31 
4 Code 175 805 0.5 0.18 0.09 0.33 
Audit 81 90 0.5 0.47 0.24 
5 Code 164 804 0.5 0.17 0.08 0.28 
Audit 65 104 0.5 0.38 0.19 
 
Based on the results depicted in Table II it is possible to observe 
that for one particular deployment the overall score is much 
larger than for the other runs (by approximately 10%) – 
calculated using equation from Section V. Utilization of the 
automated security quality gate run 3 should not be allowed to 
be deployed in the production environment, however, without 
an automated process it would be impossible to be achieved. 
Even if the introduced vulnerabilities were fixed before the next 
run, there was still a brief time when newly created 
vulnerabilities were exploitable in the production environment. 
The weight for each security issue source was set equally to 0.5 
(as it was decided that each source was equally important). 
When having more than 2 vulnerability sources a risk analysis 
should be performed and based on the results the weights to set 
should be decided. For example when the process is built from 
4 security issue sources – DAST, SAST, Infrastructure scanner 
and compliance data it could be set as follow: 
- SAST – 0.3 – in most cases the static source code 
analysis covers full code base so it is very accurate 
source of information. 
- Infrastructure – 0.3 – the infrastructure scans detect 
vulnerabilities in the installed software and in most of 
the cases provide information with high severity. 
- DAST – 0.25 – the dynamic tests in the described 
scenario are being conducted from the behind a proxy 
which strips requests and thus in turn makes the tests 
results not fully accurate. 
- Compliance – 0.15 – as issues from this source are 
often considered as supplementary information. 
  
On the other hand in run 2 we can see that a single increase of 
the FP value was not making the difference on the overall 
security score.  
 It was proven in this section that using presented security 
metric (section V) and implementing quality gate inside 
DevOps pipeline we will add possibility to block changes of 
application which contain security vulnerabilities in the 
automatic manner.   
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VII. CONCLUSION 
To authors’ best knowledge there are no existing methods or 
tools able to measure and evaluate in a complex manner the IT 
security levels of solutions deployed in the cloud environments. 
The scope and quantity of the processed data and the pace at 
which new environments are being built, strengthen our belief 
that the current development methodologies lack a generic way 
to calculate system overall security level. This paper proposed 
areas which should be taken into consideration while preparing 
the system architecture. Having all areas covered for the Service 
Discovery module, it is possible to grade the level of security of 
the whole solution, which depends only on the environment 
configuration, services running on the assets, and vulnerabilities 
found in the deployed software. Note, that the proposed 
approach does not need developers to create additional test 
cases. 
 Next step will be to implement described solution in the 
environment of a large telecommunication provider. The first 
step has already been accomplished i.e. integration with the IaaS 
layer. Integration with CI/CD layer is difficult enough that 
multiple CI tools and scripting techniques exist. When the full 
integration with CI/CD is accomplished, it will be possible to 
get complete information for the Service Discovery module and 
then based on this information create security scanners in order 
to start classifier learning process. 
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